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The impact of productive efficiency and quality of a regulated local 








In this paper, we reconstruct the process by which the decisions of a regulated local 
public utility, in terms of productive efficiency and quality of the service provided, 
impact  on  prices  of  final  consumption  goods,  supplied  in  a  oligopolistic  market 
operating in the same geographic area. We obtain some formula for these effects 
which can be quantified by estimating firms’ conditional input demand function of 
the public service and firms’ inverse demand function for this public good, non rival, 
component.  Finally,  we  draw  the  effects  of  productive  efficiency  and  quality  on 
consumer  welfare  and  cost of living,  via  changes  on  tariffs,  external  effects  and 
final goods prices. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Local  public  services,  like  water  distribution,  sewerage  treatment  and 
disposal, waste collection and disposal, gas and electricity distribution, local public 
transport by road as well by rail, not only supply consumption goods to resident 
households but also act as inputs in local firms production processes by influencing 
their costs, and consequently their final prices. First, this insertion in the productive 
processes occurs throughout the level and the dynamics of tariffs, so a crucial role 
is played by the productive (in)efficiency pushing down (up) the costs of the firm 
producing  the  service.  Secondly,  public  services  affects  production  processes  of 
firms  supplying  final  goods throughout their quality,  that,  combined with  specific 
environmental characteristics of the area, spreads positive externalities all around.  
Indeed, local public services, although in general excludable and rival ones, 
have also some public good component. For instance, waste collection and disposal, 
and sewerage service have positive external effects by cleaning the area and by 
reducing water and air pollution. Gas and electricity distribution can be organised in 
order to save exhaustible resources and to supply clean energy. Public transport, 
reducing the use of private cars, can limit urban congestion costs and air pollution. 
All those effects create positive externalities for households and create in some way 
a favourable environment for sales and exchanges of final consumption goods, thus 
rising local firms productivity. In this respect we may think at an enlarged notion of  
“accessibility” of the area, a well known concept introduced into modern regional 
economics (Behrens and Thisse 2007). 
Aim of this note is to enlighten, by a simple model, the process by which the 
decisions of a regulated local public utility (RLPU), i.e. a natural monopoly producing 
and providing a service, can determine, via cost efficiency and quality, a shift on 
final goods prices set in markets operating in the same geographic area. This shift, 
together  with  the  increase  in  consumer  externality,  impacts  also  on  consumers 
welfare itself. In particular cost efficiency and quality of local public utilities impact 
directly,  via  tariffs,  and  indirectly,  via  prices  of  final  goods  and  externalities,  on 
households  welfare,  by  influencing  the  “utility  affordability”,  according  to  an 
enlarged notion of it. The affordability concept usually refers to the direct impact of   3 
public utilities tariffs changes on household’s expenditure and welfare
1, while here 
we try to enlarge the notion by considering also the effects throughout final goods 
prices and external effects, i.e. by looking at the dynamics of households’ cost of 
living index. In other words, we want to emphasize that affordability of, say, waste 
collection and disposal depends not only on the level of tariffs paid by households 
but also on the level of final private goods, in some way influenced by quality and 
costs of the local public service for the firms in the market.    
The main results of the paper are the following ones. 
(i)  A reduction of RLPU production efficiency increases domestic and business 
tariffs, and then also final goods prices, and reduces consumer welfare. 
The sign of such changes are rather intuitive, but we obtain some formal 
and  exact  expressions  that  could  be  measured  and  tested  by  empirical 
analysis. 
(ii)  A reduction of public service quality determines some contrasting effects. 
On one hand, it drives down RLUP production costs and then tariffs and 
final goods prices. On the other hand, a reduction of quality reduces the 
positive external effect to consumers and firms. We draw some conditions 
in order to sign the total effect. Also these conditions could be tested by 
empirical analysis.     
 
The  plan  of  the  paper  is  the  following  one.  In  section  2,  we  analyse  the 
structure  of  the  three stage  game  we  are  going  to  model,  and  we  describe 
consumer preferences and choices, as well the technology and the subsequent cost 
functions  of  the  firms  involved  in  the  game.  In  section  3,  we  find  a  Cournot 
equilibrium price for a consumption good, and we analyse the RLPU choices upon 
tariffs,  quality  and  managerial  effort.  In  section  4,  we  make  some  comparative 
statics by determining the impact on final good price of decisions taken in the first 
stage by the RLPU and by determining the final impact on consumer welfare of the 
increase of tariffs, final good prices and the public good component provision. In the 
                                                            
1 For a rigorous analysis of the impact of price change on poor and then on public utilities 
affordability, see Makdissi and Wodon (2007). Differently from us, in that paper the concept 
is  studied  in  a  more  appropriate  general  equilibrium  context.  For  an  empirical  research 
referring to the affordability of some recent utilities reform in Italy see  Miniaci et al. (2008).   4 
Appendix  we  propose  an  input output  application  for  obtaining  some  numerical 
calculations of these effects. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The structure of the model 
 
The  model  we  are  going  to  present,  although  carrying  out  typical  partial 
equilibrium  results,    has  some  general  equilibrium  features  as  it  tries  to  link 
decisions taken by different agents in the economy (the Public utility manager, the 
producers  and  the  consumers).  In  this  regard,  we  consider  an  economic  district 
where n  local firms, l=1…,n, are competing in supplying a final good j and a RLPU is 
providing a public  service  to local population  and firms. We model  this economy 
with a three stage sequential game; in the first one, the RLPU chooses tariffs  and 
quality of the public service; in the second stage, the n firms, taking as given the 
RLUP strategies, reach an oligopolistic equilibrium à la Cournot. Finally, in the third 
stage,  the  representative  consumer,  facing  tariffs,  quality  and  final  good  price, 
chooses the consumption of the public service and of the final good. Therefore, by 
backward induction, the RLUP is able to carry out its strategies by knowing firms 
and  households  demand  functions  and  firms  are  able  to  choose  their  output 
quantities by knowing households demand functions. 
To summarize, the set up we have in mind is represented with the following 
table. 
 
STAGE            PLAYERS                           STRATEGIES 
   1  Local public utility  Cost efficiency,  tariffs and quality  of  the public 
service  
   2  Oligopolistic firms   Final consumption good quantity and price 
   3  Representative 
consumer  
Private good and public service consumption 
 
 
   5 
2.1. Consumer preferences and demand functions 
We start by showing the structure of representative consumer preferences by 
means of the dual surplus function: 
) , , ( G p t v v j
h = ,                  (1a) 
where (1) denotes the indirect utility function with marginal utility of income equal 
to one (no income effect), t
h denotes the domestic customers tariff which household 
is facing, pj denotes the price of the final consumption good j, and G denotes the 
public good component, or the externality, spread by the local public service to all 
citizens and firms in the area. 
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is the consumer demand of the final good j.   
Also we have that 
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is the inverse demand or “virtual price” of G, i.e. the marginal willingness to pay of 
the representative consumer for the externality of the public service
2.   
A simplifying hypothesis, which will result useful later on, is to assume for (1a) 
a separable additive function like this one: 
) , ( ) , ( 2 1 G p v G t v v j
h + =   ,                (1b) 
according to which the direct demand functions for the private goods assume the 
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2 See Cornes (1992, p. 239) and recall that in our case the marginal utility of income is equal 













2 ,                 (3b) 
where  the  sole  novelty  is  due  to  the  external  (public  good)  effect,  for which  no 
separability is allowed because we imagine that it can favour the consumption of 
both goods. 
Notice that (2b), (3b) and (4) define the equilibrium of the third stage of the 
game, giving the choices of the consumer who faces the strategies by both private 
firms and RLPU.  
 
2.2. Technology and cost functions of competing firms in final good market 
As  far  as  the  technology  of  the  firms  supplying  the  consumption  good,  we 
represent this by the following set of cost functions: 
), , , ( lj
f
l X G t C        l=1,..n,               (5) 
where t
f is business customer tariff for the direct use of the public service as input in 
producing output level Xlj of good j, whose total supply in the area is Xj=∑lXlj. Also 
the externality G enters the production process as a (non rival) public input
3. 
By Shephard’s Lemma
4, we get the conditional public service input demand of 
firm l:     
) , , ( lj
f
l f
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Moreover, by extending the notion of inverse demand or “virtual price” of a 
consumption public good (or externality) to the public input G, we represent the 
marginal willingness to pay  of  firm  l  for  the  externality  of  the  public  service 
favouring the production process of j with the following expression: 
) , , ( lj
f
l
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3 Actually, the cost function depends also on the price of private inputs, but as they remain 
constant in the subsequent analysis we have dropped them out from (5). 
4 See, for instance, Jehle and Reny (2001, p. 129).    7 
The  sum  over  the  n  firms  of  the  marginal  valuations  gives  the  aggregate 
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2.3. RLPU technology and cost function 
For taking into account the quality dimension in the RLPU production process, 
we follow the conventional wisdom of imagining the technology represented by an 
output  set  where  there  are  both  “desirable”  and  “bad”  outputs,  the  latter  being 
those with a low quality
5. Consequently, let us represent the RLPU output set with 
the following notation: 
{ } A and r given feasible y technicall is B Y A r , : ) , ( ) , (
2




  is  the  total  output  supplied  to  satisfy  households  (domestic 
customers)  demand,  and  firms  (business  customers) demand  respectively,  r  is  a 
vector  of  inputs  and  A  is  a  vector  of  environmental  variables  –  like  population 
density, altitude, orographical characteristics of the soil, level of precipitations, etc. 
Both  r  and  A  define  the  boundaries  of  the  output  set.  B  is  a  conventional  bad 
output,  consequently  if  with  +
+ - Â Ì Î ] , [ m m m   we  represent  an  index  of  service 
provision quality, measuring quality attributes by a positive real number within a 
closed interval defined by the technology of the service, the bad output is such that: 
¥ ® = <
- + ) ( , 0 ) ( , 0 ) ( ' ); ( m B m B m B m B .  
Notice that m could be an index of organoleptic properties of drinking water 
gushing out of the aqueduct or an index of supply continuity and safety for water, 
gas,  electricity  distribution.  It  could  give  a  measure  of  time  frequency  of  buses 
stops in the urban area or a measure of the extension and capillarity of a metro 
network or of the share of buses in the fleet using clean fuel. Further, it could be an 
index related to  the technological  level of  waste disposal plants  and  so on
6. The 
                                                            
5  See  for  instance  Prior  (2006)  and  Picazo Tadeo  et  al.  (2008).  Actually,  m  could  also 
represent  a  multivariate  statistics  index  obtained,  for  each  public  service,  throughout  an 
aggregation of a set of elementary indexes. 
6 These indexes are often inserted in the contract signed by the firm and the regulator by 
indicating some standard level the former has to achieve.   8 
usual assumption is that the “desirable” outputs are strongly disposable, while the 
“bad”  outputs  are  under  the  axiom  of  weak  disposability,  which  means  that  if 
) , ( ) , ( A r B Y Á Î ,  also  ) , ( ) , ( A r B Y Á Î b b   with  0≤β≤1  (Färe  et  al.  1989).  Thus 
increasing m is not a costless activity as it requires the RLUP to divert resources 
that could otherwise be devoted to producing the quantity Y.  This implies a trade 
off between quantity and quality.  
By duality, the output set of the RLUP may be represented by a cost function 
that  we  assume  to  have  the  following  functional  form,  separable  on  fixed  and 
variable costs
7:  
  CPU(Y, m,a; A)= F(m, A)+[c(m)+a]Y.             (11) 
Formally we have ¶F/¶m>0: an increase of quality provokes an increase of fixed 
costs by asking for higher infrastructural investments
8. A is assumed to influence 
production costs of the RLPU, so ¶F/¶A, with the sign of the elements of the gradient 
vector depending on the specific variable considered. c(m)+a is the marginal cost of 
the service, where c(m) is the minimum cost, given the technology, supposed to be 
an increasing function of quality, c’(m)>0, as higher quality may require more labour 
and maintenance costs, while a is a variable of x inefficiency rising a cost padding 
phenomenon. It could be a measure of perk and wasteful expenditures carried on 
by the manager or alternatively a parameter decreasing with the managerial effort. 
Of course, if the regulated firm is fully x efficient, a=0, otherwise, a>0.  
Moreover, we reasonably assume that the externality effect spread by the local 
public service to all citizens and firms in the area will come, given the output level, 
through  an  interconnection  between  service  quality  and  environmental  variables 
according to the following synthetic function: 
G= x(m,A),                     (12) 
with ¶ξ/¶m>0, while the sign of the elements of vector ¶ξ/¶A is depending, once 
again, on the specific environmental variable considered.  
                                                            
7  We  have  dropped  out  the  vector  of  input  prices  as  they  remain  fixed  throughout  the 
analysis.  
8  For  the  recent  and  relevant  strand  of  literature  linking  the  quality  of  the  service  to 
investment  costs  and  to  ownership  structure  of  a  public  utility,  see  Bennett  and  Iossa 
(2006).    9 
Notice that, given (12) and the demand structure by consumer (from (1) to 
(4)) and by firms (from (6) to (9)), we are assuming that quality enter agents pay 
offs only indirectly, i.e. throughout the external effect G
9. 
By inverting (12), we may also represent RLUP cost function directly in terms 
of the externality
10:   
CPU(Y,G,a; A)= F(ξ
-1(G,A), A)+[c(ξ
-1(G,A))+a]Y=F(G) +[c(G)+a]Y                     (13) 
Equipped with these tools we now go ahead to analyse the second and first 
stage of the game.   
 
3. Final goods prices, tariffs and quality of the public service 
 
3.1. Second stage:  Cournot equilibrium in the final good market  
Let us now suppose that the final good j is supplied in a Cournot oligopolistic 
market, where each firm considers as given, besides the output produced by others, 
also, as Stackelberg followers, the variables chosen by the RLPU, here working as a 
Stackelberg leader.  
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the correspondent elasticity.   
Therefore, the price of the final good j is given by: 
                                                            
9 For optimal regulation, in particular in telecommunications, when service quality indicators 
enter  directly  consumer  utility  and  demand  functions  see  Sappington  (2005)  and  Currier 
(2007).  As the link between quality, externality effect and agents demand is one of the 
focus of our paper we have isolated it by giving up the direct enter of quality, which however 
could be considered paying only for a bit complication of the analysis. 
10 The environmental variables A have now exhausted their explicative role, thus, as they 
will be remaining fixed in the subsequent analysis, hereafter we are going to drop them out 
from the main functions and expressions.    10
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  If we suppose a symmetric oligopoly, we have Xj= n Xlj with Xlj =xj. Thus, the 
equilibrium price becomes:  
) , , (













= .            (16) 
Moreover, in order to get from (16) a tractable function of equilibrium prices 
in terms of  the variables settled by the RLPU in the first stage of the game, we 
make two further  assumptions which simplify  the analysis, with  a  limited loss of 












is going to remain constant (i.e. it is approximately constant the consumer demand 
elasticity) w.r.t. both Xj and G. Notice that if the oligopoly were à la Bertrand in 
equilibrium would be γj=1, as well as in a perfect competitive market where  ¥ ® n . 
Secondly, in order to limit the interdependency complication coming from the fact 
that marginal cost in (16), and then the price, depends on output level of average 
firm, we assume that the cost function of average firm of industry j is given by the 
following functional separable form
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  Indeed,  given  (17),  ) , ( G t c MC
f
j j = ,  i.e.  the  marginal  cost  of  the  average 
firm producing j, depends on the business tariff, t
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j , but it is independent on the level of output, 
xj.
12 Further, by applying Shepard’s Lemma to (17), we have that the input demand 
and the virtual price of the average firm are respectively given by:  
                                                            
11 For a justification of this factorized functional form of the cost function see Cornes (1992, 
p. 107). Other general equilibrium complications might arise from firms profit distribution to 
households. We may avoid this problem by assuming that the shares of the firms are owned 
by people living outside the area. 
12 Therefore the supply function is infinitely elastic. This hypothesis, and the previous one on 
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13              (19) 
Therefore, equilibrium price becomes: 
) , ( ) , ( G t c G X P p
f
j j j j g = = .               (20) 
The relationship between the equilibrium price and the variables of the public 
service is plotted in the following figure
14. 
 
Insert Fig.1 here 
 
 
3.2. First stage:  RLPU choices  
Let us suppose that our RLPU is constrained by a Price Cap rule, putting a 
limit to average (unitary) revenue, P
0 
15 , and by the duty to reach at least a given 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
competitive markets. Recall that this the case where a tax on the consumption good is fully 
shifted onto consumers. See for instance Salaniè (2003, p. 21).   
13 Notice that now, in Cournot equilibrium, we have that  n G p d x j
h
j j / ) , ( = , hence, by substituting 
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Notice that for the latter equation, we have to assume, for regulatory concerns, that 
the virtual price of externality is in any case positive. In fact the first term in the square 
bracket is negative and the second one positive. 
 
14 Notice that demand function shifts with an increase of the externality effect, although we 
assume a constant  elasticity.  
15 This criterion for applying Price Cap regulation is behaving for one public service provided 
to different users (Armstrong et al. 1994), like that one we are here modeling. For instance, 
in the pricing method used in water service in Italy, P
0 = (R/Y) 1(1+K), thus the Cap on 
current average revenue is given by the previous period average revenue augmented by  a 
“limit  price”  coefficient  K  (Utilitatis  2005).  For  a  recent  survey  of  the  several  Price Cap   12




17 chooses tariffs, quality and managerial effort, by observing the 
household’s demand function  of  the  service,  as  a  consumer  good,  and  the  firms 
demand function of the service, as an intermediate input. Notice that, while the first 
demand  function  is  simply ) , ( G t D
h h ,  the  second  demand  function  is  a  bit  more 
complicated. Indeed, we have to recall that total industry output Xj=nxj is equal to 
consumer  demand  ) , ( G p d j
h
j ,  then  in  (18) we have  to  substitute  n G p d x j
h
j j / ) , ( = ; 
therefore, given the equilibrium price specified in (20), we have 
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, if  we assume
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The  choice  of  tariffs,  quality  and  managerial  effort  results  from  the 
maximization  of  the  total  profit  П(t
h,t
f,m,a),  comprehensive  of  the  firm 











f,G), and plus the benefit function of perk and wasteful 
expenditures (or conversely less the cost function of the managerial effort), ψ(a), 
ψ’>0, ψ”<0. For the RLUP manager the pursuit of the latter goal can be in some 
way limited by the regulator pressure, represented by a parameter  . Indeed, with 
an explicit manager preference on extra costs, the traditional effect of Price Cap on 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
typologies see Guthrie (2006). For a quality corrected Price Cap formulation (when quality 
indicators influence directly the consumer demand) see Currier (2007). 
16 We are clearly assuming that the regulator can observe and measure the service quality 
(verifiability  of  quality  level).  See  Sappington  (2005)  for  an  analysis  of  the  general 
implications of the Minimum Quality Standards (MQS) criterion of regulating quality of public 
services. This constraint could be considered as an application of “sustainable development 
duties” which are recently specifying new roles for regulation in some European countries 
(Owen 2006, Bartle and Vass 2007). 
17 This is  named by enterprise owners who may be private as well as public ones. 




















































































where the only signs we have to assume are, as in the text, the two second derivatives of 
unitary cost function.     13
limiting x inefficiency is partially reduced and, thus, the regulator must intervene by 
monitoring the RLUP activity.  
 
Therefore, we have: 
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  The correspondent Lagrangean is given by the following expression: 
L=R(t
h,t
f) –[F(m)+(c(m)+a)Y] +  ψ(a) -s [R(t
h,t
f)-P°Y]+r (m-m°).      (23) 
We  assume  that  the  regulator  has  set  up  both  P
0  and  m
0    at  a  level 
compatible with a non negative total profit: Π*≥0. Further, by the envelope theorem, 














, i.e. if each constraint is relaxed, by allowing a 
greater average revenue and/or a lower quality standard, the maximum value of 
the (indirect) objective function does not decrease.  
  Necessary conditions for optimum are: 
 
  Productive (in)efficiency (a) 




CPU Y              (24)    
By (24), in general a*>0. However a*=0 when the regulation pressure is hard 
and successful, i.e. when  0 ® m . We may say that policies aimed, on one hand, at 
improving  the  efficacy  and  strength  of  regulation  by  monitoring  and  audit 
procedures  of  cost padding  (Laffont  and  Tirole,  1993,  ch.12),  and,  on  the  other 
hand, at carrying on pro competitive liberalization measures, and for pursuing the 
competition  by  franchise  bidding,  should  in  some  way  reduce  a  (Armstrong  and 
Sappington, 2006). But it still remains a variable under manager’s control. In the 
following  figure  we  represent  the  level  of  productive  inefficiency  chosen  by  the 
manager and, in some sense, “allowed” by the uninformed regulator.  
         14
Insert Fig.2  here 
 
  Tariffs (t
h,t
f) 
If the Price Cap constraint is binding, we obtain, after usual manipulations, 





























- º e   is  the  elasticity  of  demand  for  the  service  by  domestic  or 
business users; both assumed to be constant in the relevant time. From condition 
(25),  the  optimal  tariff  is  an  increasing  function  of  quality  and  productive 
inefficiency
19 










º   is  the  mark up  over  marginal  cost  (with  some  cost 
padding) allowed to the RLPU for tariff u, u=h, f. Notice that we have  1 >
u b , as, for 













º   is  an  implicit  unit  tax  on 
output  u,  levied  by  the  regulator  for  limiting  the  RLUP  rent
20.  The  following  two 
figures  represent  the  relationships  between  tariff  u,  productive  inefficiency  and 
quality. 
 
Insert Fig.3a and 3b here 
 
                                                            
19 See, for instance, the role of changes in costs and quality in determining the changes in 
average water users bills taken into account by OFWAT in UK (Zabel 2007).  
20 Notice that, by this formulation, the differentiation between domestic and business tariffs 
lies only  on  demand elasticity differences. Indeed if  ε
h> ε
f (in the sense that the public 
service is more substitutable by the consumer than by the firms), t
f>t
h  as we expect to 
happen.  Actually,  in  real  world,  this  differentiation  is  justified  by  other  elements,  mainly 
linked to equity concerns.      15
Indeed, with tariffs structure given by (25) and (26), the RLUP manager is 
able  to  cover  variable  and  fixed  costs  and  possibly  get  some  extra profit  and 
wasteful expenditures
21.  
Notice that if Price Cap constraint is not binding and then σ=0, it is T
u = 0 










, as in case of a pure un regulated monopoly. 
 
  Quality (m) 
As  far  as  the  choice  of  quality  index  is  concerned,  we  have  the  following 
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Hence, an increase of quality level firstly increases fixed costs and variable 
costs, then produces an externality which increases domestic and business users’ 
demand  and  consequently,  again  variable  costs,  but  also  revenues.  If  both 
regulation constraints are not binding, and then σ=ρ=0, condition (27) collapses to 
the  usual  one,  referring  to  a  unregulated  monopoly  supplier  (Sappington  2005): 
MRm = MCm. If the Price Cap constraint is not binding, i.e.  ° < YP R(.)  and σ=0, while 
standard quality constraint is binding, i.e. m*=m° and r>0, condition (27) implies 
MRm<MCm=MRm+ρ. However no comparison can be made between MCm and MRm 
when also σ>0.  
In the following figure we represent (for simplicity with σ=0) the equilibrium 




* m m > ) and the one where it is binding (
0
2
* m m = ), respectively. 
                                                            
21 In this respect, we assume, as for oligopolistic firms, that RLUP profit will be distributed to 
shareholders living outside the area.   16
 
      Insert Fig. 4 here 
 
 
4.  The  impact  on  final  good  price  and  consumer  welfare  of  productive 
efficiency and quality 
  
4.1. The impact on final good price 
  We are firstly interested in exploring the effects on pj  of an increase of a, 
coming  from  a  reduction  of  the  regulator  controlling  power  on  RLUP  productive 
efficiency, and of a reduction of m, coming from a relaxation of the standard quality 
constraint leaving room for the RLUP manager to expand the profit. What we are 
going to study is some static comparative exercises around the equilibrium of the 
previous sequential game.   
We can settle the following two summarising Propositions. 
 
Proposition 1  
The impact of a productive efficiency reduction of the service provided by the RLPU 











= D g .                                (28) 
Proof 
The impact of a change of the tariff on marginal cost of good j is given, according to 
the  so  called  Young’s  theorem
22,  by  the  derivative  of  conditional  input  demand 
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= D g . Thus, the inflationary push on price of good j of the tariff 
                                                            
22 See Cornes (1992, p. 106).   17
is proportional to the derivative of unitary cost factor w.r.t. business tariff. On the 
other  hand,  from  (26)  we  have  a b t
f f D = D ,  i.e.  the  change  on  the  tariff  is 
proportional to the change in the efficiency parameter a. By substituting, we obtain 
expression (28). □ 
 
Expression  (28),  surely  positive,  is  quite  intuitive  as  it  says  that  the 
inflationary  push  of  productive  inefficiency  of  the  RLUP  is  simply  given  by 
multiplying the effect of tariff on the firm unitary cost with the mark ups prevailing 
in the oligopolistic final good market and in the regulated monopoly.  
 
Proposition 2  
The impact of a quality reduction of the service provided by the RLPU on final good 
price is given by the following expression:            
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Proof 
A containment of quality index reduces, on one hand, the variable costs and then 
the marginal cost of the RLPU. Consequently, from (26) we have a reduction of the 
tariff given by  m m c b t










= D g , 
we  get  the  first  term  in  the  square  bracket  of  (29),  giving  a  final  good  price 
reduction. On the other hand, we have an externality effect created by the quality 
index  change  on  marginal  cost  of  producing  good  j,  given  by 
) ( ' ) ( '
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.  However,  with  cost  function 













.  Thus,  we  get  the 
second term in expression (29), giving the inflationary push of a lower quality. □ 
 
The sign of (29) is uncertain depending on which of the two opposite effects 
tends to prevail. Also in (29), the two mark ups play a relevant role; but now, while   18
b
f tends only to contain the inflationary push of quality reduction, γj determines two 
opposite  effects,  via  a  costs  containment  and  a  costs  increase.  Notice  that,  by 
inserting expression (28) in (29), we obtain a  combination of the two inflationary 


















, i.e. the inflationary effect of an increase of the 
quality is spread by the inflationary push due to productive inefficiency. In other 
words,  the  effect  of  better  quality  may  be  inflationary  (deflationary)  if  the 
inflationary effect of productive inefficiency is high (low) because it is high (low) the 
capacity of the RLPU manager to translate extra costs on tariffs. This result may be 
synthesized by the following: 
 
Corollary 1 
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According to (30), the threshold  c  increases with the mark up in final good 












º , a parameter measuring the relative effect of m 
on the costs structure of the two goods, the final one and the public service.   19
 
4.2. The impact on consumer welfare 
We now investigate the effect of productive efficiency and quality changes on 
consumer welfare, which, given (1b), (12), (20) and (26) may be now represented 
by the function  
)) ( ), , ( ( )) ( ), , ( ( ) , ( 2 1 m a m p v m a m t v a m v j
h x x + = .                                             (31) 
Changes in productive efficiency produce two effects on consumer welfare
23: 
via  tariff  for  domestic  customers,  t
h,  and  via  price  of  final  good,  pj.  Changes  in 
quality, instead, produce three effects on consumer welfare: once again via tariff for 
domestic  customers  and  via  price  of  final  good  j,  but  also  directly  via  the 
externality, G. We summarize the total effects with the following two propositions: 
         
 
Proposition 3  
The impact of a productive efficiency reduction of the service provided by the RLPU 
on consumer welfare is given by the following expression: 





h h D ¶ ¶ + - = D ] ) / ( [ g .            (32) 
Proof 
By direct computation of the total differential of (31) and by substituting (28). □ 
 
The two effects in square bracket of (32) are both positive. Thus  0 / < D D a v : 
the consumer is always worse off with a higher productive inefficiency of RLUP and 
then only a
*=0 is going to maximize v(m,a).  Hence, a clear conflict arises between the 
consumer and the RLPU manager which is mediated by the role of regulator.  
         
Proposition 4  
The impact of a quality reduction of the service provided by the RLPU on  consumer 
welfare is given by the following expression:              
                                                            
23  For  a  general  equilibrium  analysis  of  more  “exact”  welfare  measures  of  tax  and  price 
changes, see Creedy (2000).    20
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Proof 
By direct computation of the total differential of (31) and by substituting (29). □ 
 
The sign of (33) is uncertain. Indeed, although a reduction of quality has a 
negative  direct  impact  on  consumer  welfare,  the  latter  may  be,  somewhat 
paradoxically,  better off  if  a  decrease  of  quality  implies  a  relevant  reduction  on 
domestic tariff and final good price given by a reduction on RLPU marginal cost. So 
there is a finite level of 
0 * m m ³ maximizing v(m,a). Particularly interesting is the polar 
case of a perfect competitive setting in both markets and a First best context for the 
public service supply, which we may put in terms of the following statement: 
 
Corollary 2 
With a=σ=ρ=0,  b
f= γj =1 and an Hotelling tariff structure
24  such that t
u= c(m), u=h,f, we 
get the familiar Samuelson condition for efficient supply of public goods, according 
to which the social marginal benefit of public good  G,  G SMB , is equal to its social 
marginal cost,  G SMC . 
Proof 
If we maximize v(m,a) w.r.t. m, from (33) we get the F.O.C. 
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By summing up (32) and (33) effects we obtain the total effect   V D  of x 
inefficiency and low quality of the public service on consumer welfare. Such a total 
effect may be usefully linked to the effect on consumer cost of living index which 
                                                            
24 Notice that, in this case, we assume that fixed costs of firm producing the public service 
are financed by some national Authority without taxing the local community or applying a 
fixed poll to local users.    21
gives an exact measure of the public service general affordability. In compact terms 
we have the following statement: 
 
Corollary 3 
The  impact  of  reduction  of  RLUP  productive  efficiency  and  quality  on  household 
cost of living is given by  V D - 1  . 
Proof 
The total effect  (32) plus (33) can be easily rewritten as 
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where E(t
h,pj,G) is the expenditure function
25. Now with 
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= º              
we  represent  the  consumer  cost of living  index
26  from  time  0  to  time  1.  If  we 
normalise  by  putting  w.l.g.  the  “reference  household  expenditure”  equal  to  one, 
1 ) , , (
0 0 0 = G p t E j
h , the cost of living index becomes:  
  V G p t E CLIndex j
h D - = D + º 1 ) , , ( 1 .  □ 
 
Consequently, by summing up (32) and (33) we have a clear measure of the 
impact of a decrease of cost efficiency and quality of the public service on a wide 






                                                            
25  Notice  that  the  concept  must  be  converted  to  our  context  where  the  compensated 
(hicksian)  demand  function  coincides  with  the  uncompensated  (marshallian)  one  (Cornes 
1992, Creedy 2000). Further, – V is the amount of  numeraire (the surplus) the consumer is 
available  to  give  up  to  buy  D
h  and 
h
j d   after  the  increase  in  the  two  prices  and  in  the 
externality; hence it is equal to the expenditure function change. 
26 See Cornes (1992, pp. 222 223 and p. 239).   22
5. Some conclusion and a bridge towards empirical analysis 
 
Local public services run as consumption goods to resident households as well 
as  inputs  in  local  firms  production  processes  by  influencing  their  costs  and 
consequently  their  final  prices.  This  insertion  in  consumption  and  productive 
decisions processes occurs, first of all, throughout the level and the dynamics of 
tariffs, so a crucial role is played by the productive efficiency pushing up or down 
the  costs  of  the  firm  producing  the  service.  Secondly,  the  public  service  enters 
consumer  utility  as  well  as  production  processes  of  firms  supplying  final  goods 
throughout  the  quality  of  provision,  that,  combined  with  specific  environmental 
characteristics of the area, determines the degree by which this spreads positive 
externalities all around.  
The Propositions of previous section point out that in order to ascertain the 
impact of efficiency and quality on final good prices  and on consumer welfare  is 
crucial to derive and analyse the consumer demand function, the firms conditional 
demand  function  of  the  private  component  of  the  public  service,  as  well  as  the 
inverse  demand  functions  for  the  public  good  (non rival)  component  of  this  by 
business users and consumer users, i.e. the so called virtual prices. We derive all 
these functions but it is a task of empirical estimation of these functions to derive 
numerically  the dimension of  this  impact. Actually it is  not,  for  lack of  data and 
information, an easy task, even referring to linear cost functions as we did. The 
latter  hypothesis    however  is  simplifying  the  theoretical  model  as,  in  the  main 
formulas,  it  appears  straightforward  the  role  of  the  derivative  of  unitary  cost 
function with respect to business tariffs and the externality.     
In any case, Proposition 1 clarifies that the inflationary push of productive 
inefficiency directly depends, as it is intuitive, both on the mark up realised in the 
market of final goods and the mark up allowed to the RLPU, but it depends also on 
the  “technical  coefficient”  of  public  service  input  acquired  by  the  oligopolistic 
industry of final good j. According to Proposition 2, instead, the effect on final price j 
of a quality reduction in general cannot be signed, as it depends on two opposite 
forces: a reduction of RLPU variables cost and a decrease of the externality, the 
latter depending on function which describes the way by which quality gives rise to   23
a public input. When this effect is relevant the impact of quality reduction (increase) 
may be indeed inflationary (deflationary).  
For both impact effects on the final price, a relevant role is played by the 
degree of  competition  on market of  final  goods  – here  represented by  the  term 
(1/n)     and  of  regulation  pressure  on  the  public  utility  management  –  here 
enlightened by the parameters  , P
0 and m
0. 
Finally,  according  to  Proposition  3,  we  have  that  changes  in  productive 
efficiency produce two effects on consumer welfare: via tariff for domestic users, t
h, 
and via price of final good, pj. This effect is surely negative and has also a negative 
impact  on  Cost of living  (and  affordability)  index.  According  to  Proposition  4, 
instead,  we  have  that  changes  in  quality  produce  three  effects  on  consumer 
welfare: once again via tariff for domestic users and via price of final good j, but 
also  directly  via  the  externality,  G.  The  effect  of    a  decrease  of  quality  will  be 
negative,  taking  into  account  of  its  positive  external  effect,  but  it  could  be, 
somewhat paradoxically, positive if there is a corresponding significant reduction of 
tariff for domestic users and final goods prices.  
The sign and the numerical dimension of these effects could be ascertained only 
with a specific empirical analysis, giving us some appropriate estimation of cost and 
demand functions. Indeed,  this paper has  tried  to put  clearly on  the ground  the 
main  theoretical arguments for building  this desirable  econometric model. In  the 
meantime, we resort in the Appendix to an input output analysis, at a local level, 
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Measuring the impact of production costs changes of public utilities on final 
prices: some calculations thorough input-output analysis 
 
In order to obtain empirical estimations of the impact of efficiency and quality 
of a given local public utility on final good prices and on consumer welfare, along 
the  Propositions  of  our  model,  we  should  derive  econometric  estimates  of  the 
consumer  demand  functions  (2a),  (2b)  and  (4),  and  firms’  conditional  demand 
function of the private and public components of the public service, (18) and (19). 
Further,  we  should  estimate  the  unitary  public  utility  cost  function  and  the 
elasticities of demand for the public service included in (25). We also should have a 
mathematical  expression  of  the  technological  relationship  between  quality  and 
externality effect synthetized in (12). Clearly it is not an easy task, as most of these 
data  and  informations  are  not  available  at  local  level.  However,  some  numerical 
calculations can be obtained by using an input output matrix with reference to a 
specific  local  economy,  where  one  or  more  local  public  utilities  are  providing 
services to an industry.  
In this respect, Istituto Regionale per la Programmazione Economica Toscana 
(IRPET),  an  Italian  research  institute  in  regional  economics,  has  got  a  detailed 
regional input output matrix, which is also decentralised at the level of each one of 
the nine Provinces of Tuscany (Italy). So, for carrying on a numerical exercise, we 
have chosen to consider Prato, the most industrialised Province of the region, where 
there  is  a  relevant  textile  industry  with  more  than  four  thousand  local  firms 
competing each other and within the international market, a so called “industrial 
district”.  
From the IRPET I O matrix we may pick up, with reference to the last year 
available, 2006, two coefficients: aET = 0.036475 and aWT = 0.003323. The first one 
represents the input flow of Energy and Gas (E) employed in the production branch   27
labelled as Textile industry (T) of the district of Prato, and the second one the input 
flow  from  Water  (W)  to  Textile  industry.  According  to  our  model  notations  (see 













































where, now, pT must be interpreted as the price, in base year, of the composite 
textile good from the branch. Consequently, we get the following two equations: 
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= D g , and by using for the mark up a 
value approximately equal to one (given the high elasticity of demand of the good 
and n=4337)



















According to these estimates, an increase of 10% of Energy (Water) business 
tariff implies an increase of 0,36% (0,033%) in the price of the composite textile 
good.  
Given (26), we can link this effect to changes in effective production costs of 
the public utilities supplying Energy and Water to textile firms of Prato, as in (28) of 
Proposition 1 (changes  in productive  inefficiency)  and  in the first  part in  (29) of 
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. Hence, we get: 
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27 With a elasticity of demand say of  2.5 we have  . 1
1 5 , 2 . 4337
5 , 2 . 4337
@
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= T g     28
where, given a higher degree of competition in Energy and Gas sector than in Water 
sector, it will probably be  . 1 > G > G E W  
If we leave out of consideration the structure of our model, we may refer to 
the nominal  I O model by which the vector of prices p is, in a general equilibrium 
context,  linked  to  the  vector  of  value  added  coefficients  c  by  the  well  known 
matricial structure:  p=c(I A)
 1. By this system of equations we can evaluate the 
impact – the direct one and indirect one, throughout the effects on intermediate 
goods purchased by the Textile branch   on final price of a change of factors cost, 
and  then  tariffs,  in  the  sectors  of  Energy  and  Water.  The  result  of  the  matrix 
inversion tells us that the 2,91% of the final price of the composite textile good is 
given by Energy factors cost and the 0,15% by Water factors cost. Actually, these 
effects  are  very  limited,  if  we  compare  them  with  the  direct  effects  and  those 
coming from imported intermediate goods. However, these effects result to be high 
if  we  compare  them  with  those  referring  to  other  branches,  outside  the  textile 
district, in Province of Prato. For instance, the effect of Water factors cost on Textile 
industry final price, although limited, is more that three times that one on the price 
of Mechanics branch and about the double of that one on the price of Paper branch. 
    29
 
 
 Fig. 1: Equilibrium price of the final good j as a function of tariff and externality effect of 
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Fig. 2: the level of productive inefficiency chosen by the RLUP manager according to   
 
































Fig. 3a: the relationship between t
u and a           Fig. 3b: the relationship between t












































Fig.4: the RLUP choice of quality level within the mini max interval and given two targets of  
m
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